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ORBITAL DEBRIS: THE GROWING THREAT TO SPACE OPERATIONS
Nicholas L. Johnson*
For nearly 50 years the amount of man-made debris in Earth orbit
steadily grew, accounting for about 95% of all cataloged space objects
over the past few decades. The Chinese anti-satellite test in January
2007 and the accidental collision of two spacecraft in February 2009
created more than 4000 new cataloged debris, representing an increase
of 40% of the official U.S. Satellite Catalog. The frequency of collision
avoidance maneuvers for both human space flight and robotic operations
is increasing along with the orbital debris population. However, the
principal threat to space operations is driven by the smaller and much
more numerous uncataloged debris. Although the U.S. and the
international aerospace communities have made significant progress in
recognizing the hazards of orbital debris and in reducing or eliminating
the potential for the creation of new debris, the future environment is
expected to worsen without additional corrective measures.
INTRODUCTION
Although the very first object cataloged by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN) in
1957 was a piece of orbital debris, i.e., the rocket body for Sputnik 1, the orbital debris
population did not begin to grow significantly until the first on-orbit explosion of a man-made
vehicle in June 1961 created nearly 300 trackable debris. Just prior to the explosion, the total
artificial satellite population of the Earth, including operational spacecraft and orbital debris,
was only a little more than five dozen objects. In the ensuing 45 years, the population of large
orbital debris (> 10 cm) grew at a rate of nearly 300 objects per year, excludin 1g the two-yearperiod of 1989-1990 associated with a higher than normal period of solar activity.
The primary source (52% by end of 2006) of the cataloged orbital debris population in low
Earth orbit (LEO; less than 2000 km mean altitude) was the numerous fragmentations of space
vehicles, although derelict intact spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages continued to
accumulate. By the beginning of 2007 a total of 190 satellites had been involved in known
breakups not associated with reentry into the atmosphere, and another 50 orbital vehicles had
experienced lower level, anomalous fragmentation events.2 However, on a more positive note,
national and international policies and practices had clearly curtailed the frequency of major
satellite fragmentations with long-lived debris since the mid-1990’s (see below).
Unfortunately, major satellite breakups, both intentional and accidental, have dramatically
increased the number of debris in LEO since the start of 2007 (Figure 1). In particular, the
deliberate destruction of the Chinese Fengyun-1 C spacecraft in 2007 and the accidental
collision of an American and a Russian spacecraft in 2009 alone have increased the large
object population in LEO by approximately 70%. Another major launch vehicle stage explosion
in early 2007 also created hundreds of debris in elliptical orbits passing through LEO.
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Figure 1. Growth of the cataloged satellite population. Note that some debris from the
major breakups of 2007 and 2009 have yet to be officially cataloged.
In the long-term, the accumulation of mass in LEO will govern the future hazards to
operational spacecraft as a result of accidental collisions among resident space objects.
Excluding the components of the International Space Station (ISS), the annual rate of growth of
mass in LEO has recently been on the order of 50 metric tons (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Accumulation of mass in low Earth orbit, excluding components of the ISS.
The decline in 2001 was due to the de-orbit of the Mir space station.
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The orbital debris situation in geosynchronous orbit (GEO) has also been evolving
negatively. Although removal of spacecraft from GEO at the end of mission has been
recommended for decades, the number of large objects in GEO continues to grow, in part due
to the increased number of operational spacecraft and in part due to the failure or
abandonment of spacecraft and launch vehicle stages in or near GEO. During the 10 year
period of 2000-2009, the number of spacecraft entering GEO exceeded that being removed by
more than two to one. New data also indicate that the smaller, uncataloged debris population
near GEO already exceeds that of the known satellite population (Figure 3). 3
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Figure 3. NASA assessment of the near-GEO satellite population.
RECENT EVENTS
By far the most devastating impact on the LEO environment was the Chinese anti-satellite
(ASAT) test conducted on 11 January 2007 and which resulted in the destruction of the
Fengyun-1 C meteorological satellite in a circular orbit with a mean altitude near 850 km. 4-5 No
ASAT test had created orbital debris in more than 20 years prior to 2007. By the third
anniversary of the Chinese test, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network had officially cataloged
nearly 2700 debris from Fengyun-1 C, and hundreds more were being tracked but not yet
cataloged. Only 2.5% of the cataloged debris had fallen back to Earth, and many of the debris
will remain in orbit for several decades, some for more than a century. By comparison, less
than 300 debris were cataloged from the 1985 U.S. ASAT test and all had decayed within 19
years of the test. Likewise, nine orbital debris clouds created by the former Soviet Union during
20 ASAT tests in the 1960-1980’s left only 80 cataloged debris on average per test.
distribution of the debris from Fengyun-1 C, Iridium 33, and Cosmos 2251 throughout LEO with
The February 2009 collision between the operational Iridium 33 and the non-functional
Cosmos 2251 spacecraft was only a little less detrimental to the LEO with more than 1600
cataloged debris and hundreds more detected and awaiting cataloging. 6 Figure 4 indicates the
the heaviest concentrations in the 750-900 km regime, which hosts many critical operational
scientific and applications spacecraft.
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Figure 4. Nearly 4200 cataloged debris from Fengyun-1C, Iridium 33, and Cosmos 2251
in January 2010. Legend: x denotes apogee and + denotes perigee.
A second severe satellite fragmentation also occurred in 2007. In 2006 an upper stage of a
Russian Proton launch vehicle failed shortly after the beginning of the second of four planned
ignitions, stranding the stage and its payload in elliptical orbits with perigees near 500 km
altitude. 7
 Almost exactly one year later the upper stage, which still contained a large amount of
unused propellant, exploded, creating as many as 1000 large debris. These debris are hard to
track, and less than 100 have been cataloged to date.
The estimated 6,000 large debris (>10 cm) created in the three incidents cited above are
but a fraction of the much more numerous smaller debris which pose hazards to operational
spacecraft. The Fengyun-1 C fragmentation alone is estimated to have produced over 150,000
debris larger than 1 cm, each capable of disabling any manned or robotic spacecraft. 8
COUNTERMEASURES
The absolute risks to operational spacecraft from collisions with man-made debris remain
low, as evidenced by only one known permanent loss of a functioning spacecraft (Iridium 33) to
date. However, the threat to approximately 1000 operational satellites now in orbit about the
Earth increases with the growth of the orbital debris population. The three principal
countermeasures to this threat which are being employed are shielding, collision avoidance,
and curtailment of the creation of new debris through design and operational practices.
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Shielding Against Orbital Debris
Due to their very large numbers, the greatest threat to operational spacecraft comes from
small, untracked debris. The inherent structure of satellites provide some protection from the
smallest orbital debris, i.e., less than 1 mm, but most satellites are vulnerable to impacts from
particles in the millimeter-class size regime and larger. NASA estimates that on the order of
100 million particles larger than 1 mm now traverse LEO. Of these, about 500,000 are larger
than 1 cm.
Shielding technologies have advanced considerably since the 1960’s when simple Whipple
shields were utilized to guard against the natural meteoroid environment. The ISS employs
hundreds of custom-made shields to protect critical components of the extensive structure,
including habitable compartments and vital external units and lines. 9 Since the orbital debris
environment presents a very asymmetric flux to the ISS, not all critical surfaces need the same
level of protection. Figure 5 illustrates one of the stuffed Whipple shields on the ISS, which
uses a sandwich of Nextel and Kevlar inserts between the front thin bumper and the larger
vehicle wall to increase the stopping power of the configuration within space and mass limits.
Figure 5. A stuffed Whipple shield used by the International Space Station.
The latest concepts for improved orbital debris shields involve replacing typical Whipple
stuffing materials and aluminum honeycomb with new metallic foams. 10 These new designs
offer greater protection from the meteoroid and orbital debris environments with less overall
structural mass.
Figure 6. Comparison of damages in a honeycomb core (top) and open-cell metallic
foam core (bottom). (From Reference 10)
Shielding techniques, however, are practical only for particles on the order of 1 cm or less.
Moreover, many robotic spacecraft cannot not afford the mass penalty associated with orbital
debris shields, and payload elements frequently cannot host shields for operational reasons.
Collision Avoidance
NASA implemented collision avoidance procedures for human space flight after the Space
Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986. In cooperation with U.S. Air Force Space Command, the
conjunction assessment process was significantly improved by the time of the launch of the first
element of the ISS, i.e., the Zarya module in 1998. Collision avoidance maneuvers for selected
NASA robotic satellites began in 2005, and since 2008 all NASA maneuverable satellites in
LEO and GEO are required to routinely have conjunctions assessments performed with the
assistance of U.S. Strategic Command. 1
During 2009 five different NASA robotic spacecraft, as well as the Space Shuttle and the
ISS, conducted collision avoidance maneuvers (Table 1). As a result of the collision of Iridium
33 and Cosmos 2251 in early 2009, the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) of the U.S.
Strategic Command now conducts conjunction assessments for all operational spacecraft in
Earth orbit, regardless of ownership nationality. Any prediction of a close approach, typically
within one kilometer, will be shared with the spacecraft owner/operator freely and immediately.
Due to inherent uncertainties in space surveillance measurements, the dynamic state of the
atmosphere, and, in many cases, the instability of at least one of the conjuncting objects,
predicting the collision of two satellites remains a probabilistic endeavor. Typical collision
avoidance maneuver probability thresholds are 1 in 10,000 for human space flight and 1 in
1,000 or more for robotic satellites.
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Table 1. NASA Collision Avoidance Maneuvers in 2009.
Spacecraft Maneuver Date Object Avoided
TDRS 3 27 Janaury Proton rocket body
ISS 22 March CZ-4 rocket body debris
Cloudsat 23 April Cosmos 2251 debris
EO-1 11 May Zenit rocket body debris
ISS 17 July Proton rocket body debris
Space Shuttle 10 September ISS debris
Aqua 25 November Fengyun-1C debris
Landsat 7 11 December Formosat 3D
Contrary to common belief, collision avoidance maneuvers are normally not highly
disruptive to satellite operations. Moreover, collision avoidance maneuvers are typically very
small, i.e., involve changes in velocity of less than 1 meter per second, and in most cases can
be conducted in a manner which does not waste propellant resources. For example, collision
avoidance maneuvers performed by the ISS almost always result in a small increase in orbital
altitude and thus simply constitute an unscheduled anti-drag maneuver. Similar procedures are
used for robotic satellites.
In addition to the obvious due diligence aspect of protecting operational spacecraft, one
long-term benefit of collision avoidance is the prevention of collisions between two large
objects, which in turn could further degrade near-Earth space with large numbers of new
debris, as was the case with the collision of Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251. On the other hand,
over 99% of the risk to operational spacecraft from collisions with orbital debris comes from
objects too small to track on a routine basis, i.e., smaller than 10 cm. Hence, only an
improvement in the orbital debris environment itself can dramatically reduce the risks to
operational spacecraft.
Orbital Debris Mitigation Policies and Practices
One of the first comprehensive sets of orbital debris mitigation recommendations was
issued by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics in 1981. 12 Orbital debris
mitigation was first mentioned in President Reagan’s National Space Policy in 1988. 13
Following the first U.S. government interagency report on orbital debris in 1989, NASA issued
in 1995 the first formal orbital debris mitigation guidelines for a U.S. government agency. 14-15
These guidelines served as the basis for U.S. Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices,
which was adopted in 2001 after a multi-year coordination with the U.S. aerospace industry. 16
The purpose of all these documents was to outline spacecraft and launch vehicle design
and operational procedures which would reduce the amount of unnecessary orbital debris
being generated accidentally or intentionally, thus promoting the safe and reliable operation of
spacecraft. The main areas covered were normal operations, accidental explosions, orbit
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selection, and postmission disposal. The last also addressed the human casualty risk
associated with reentering debris.
In 2002 the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), comprised of the
space agencies of 10 nations plus the European Space Agency, adopted space debris
mitigation guidelines, which were then submitted for consideration to the Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. 17
 After several years of debate and negotiations, space debris mitigation guidelines
were accepted by the UN in 2007. 18-19
Although not rising to the status of an international treaty, the UN space debris mitigation
guidelines are recommended for implementation via national procedures. For example, the UN
guidelines are compatible with the U.S. Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices, which are
implemented for government-sponsored space missions through directives of NASA and the
Department of Defense and for commercial space operations through the regulations of the
Department of Transportation, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Department
of Commerce. Several other nations have invoked similar, non-voluntary orbital debris
mitigation requirements.
THE WAY AHEAD
The U.S. and the rest of the international aerospace community well recognize the threat
posed by the enormous amount of potentially hazardous debris already in Earth orbit. The
major space-faring nations and organizations have implemented and continue to improve
effective responses to portions of this threat. In addition, efforts to curtail the creation of new
orbital debris have been successful, notwithstanding the recent set-backs associated with the
intentional destruction of the Fengyun-1C spacecraft and the accidental collision of Iridium 33
and Cosmos 2251.
However, studies have shown that the orbital debris population will continue to grow
without direct intervention, i.e., the removal of large resident space objects. 20-23 Since 2006, the
International Academy of Astronautics has been conducting a special study on different
techniques to remediate the near-Earth space environment. In December 2009 NASA and the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) co-sponsored the first international
conference on orbital debris removal. Technical proposals for removing orbital debris, both
small and large and in low or high orbits, were discussed, as were the related economic, legal,
and policy challenges associated with such an undertaking. Whereas some promising
concepts have been offered, the magnitude of a program to remove debris from orbit remains
considerable, and significant near-term solutions are not anticipated.
SUMMARY
The current orbital debris environment poses a real, albeit low level, threat to the operation
of spacecraft in both LEO and GEO. A variety of countermeasures, including curtailment of
new debris generation, shielding, and collision avoidance, are being implemented by a growing
number of satellite owner/operators. For such countermeasures to be effective, they should be
considered very early in the design of each spacecraft and implemented throughout the mission
and disposal phases. Remediation of near-Earth space remains a longer term objective.
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